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The prospect of the social backsliding of middle-class groups in western countries has
not benefited the left but fueled right-wing populism. This article examines mediating and
moderating factors between economic threat and political choices. The shift of liberals
toward conservatism and the activation of passive authoritarians explain sudden changes
more than dispositional factors. Attachment to groups under stress activates coalitional
mindsets, and coalitional competition for scarce resources matches the conservative
propensity to detect threats from outgroups. Risk-averse right-wing authoritarians should
recoil from social-dominance oriented risk-takers but they follow winners despite their
mutual differences concerning family values. Authoritarian aggression unites RWA and
SDO, but politically passive right-wing authoritarians can also follow their economic
interests, when these are not entangled with cultural values. Right-wing populists have
been able to compensate economic insecurity with epistemic security. Identity politics
supports the coherence of right-wing populist parties but divides leftist/liberal groups
due to intersectional competition for victimhood.
Keywords: status anxiety, middle class, attachment to groups, coalition formation, identity politics
MYSTERIOUS LINKS
The rise of right-wing populisms during the long recession/stagnation following the implosion of
global finance in 2008 is spurring researchers to reconsider their theories of motivation. Economic
losses, real and perceived, and persistent insecurity, have not led to alternative economic policies.
Traditional class parties have been shrinking, while a new Manichean political division is leaning
on cultural values. The goal of this article is to determine how economic anxieties are mediated into
boosting status through collective identifications.
Stressful economic changes can be taken as a given on the basis of the literature on economic
history and politics in the U. S. and in Western Europe since WWII, and especially concerning the
contrast between the “golden three decades” after the war and the last three decades of neoliberal
financialization. The age of wars and extremisms was followed by an era of domesticated capitalism:
labor-related income rose in pace with growth and productivity, full employment was attained and
risks were collectivized by means of social insurance and welfare services. This long cycle based
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on the mass production of consumer durables, cheap raw
material and energy, the communist isolation of most of
Asia from competition, and, last but not least, the ideological
competition that compelled employers to pay decent wages
to pre-empt socialism came to an end in the 1970s through
an overproduction crisis and decreasing profits. Since then,
collective bargaining and trade unions have been diminished
under corporate pressure, and the freedom of capital movement
has rendered national politics into mere adaption to global
competition. Welfare services have retrenched and individuals
have shouldered more responsibility for their employability and
health. Incomes have polarized after the long compression,
especially through the difference in taxation of capital income
and labor income (Castel, 1996; Brenner, 2006; Brynjolfsson and
McAfee, 2014; Piketty, 2014; Bivens and Mishel, 2015; Nachtwey,
2016; Cohen, 2017; Goodman and Soble, 2017; Lakner, 2017;
Tyson and Spence, 2017; Weil, 2017; Temin, 2018; Tooze, 2018).
The financialized economy is no longer reinvigorated through
job creation and wages but by boosting asset and real estate values
with “quantitative easing.”
In defense of global exchange as a positive-sum game against
populisms, many researchers have emphasized that Western
countries have not been immiserated, even though Asian middle
classes have been the biggest winners, along with the global top
1%. Automation and global cheap labor have not destroyed the
middle classes: the upper middle classes have been growing more
rapidly even as the lower ones have contracted. Social mobility
still occurs and people still reach the upper tiers of income
(Hirschl and Rank, 2015; Milanović, 2016; Rose, 2016; Pinker,
2018).
A buoyant “average” does not, however, remove the sense
of relative loss for individuals, regions, and groups. Income
volatility due to job changes has increased. Unpredictable work
makes debt service difficult (Dynan, 2010; Cooper, 2014). In
the U. S., even college-level salaries stagnated during the 2000s
(Inglehart and Norris, 2017). The USA overcame the recession
as soon as 2010 but even the highest wages reached their pre-
crisis level as late as in 2015, despite full employment (Schmitt
et al., 2018). This trend of decoupling labor income from
growth and rising asset prices has been obvious in Germany
and Finland, as well. Younger generations no longer believe
in their chances to achieve and surpass the standard of living
of their parents (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2011; Pew Research
Center/Global Attitudes and Trends, 2014; Luttrell andMcGrath,
2015; Deal and Levenson, 2016; Kinnunen and Mäki-Fränti,
2016; Twenge et al., 2016; Brooks, 2017; Wichter, 2017). People
mostly concerned about falling backward are those low enough
but still with a significant measure of status to defend (Kuziemko
et al., 2014).
It is better to ignore the short-term booms and busts and take
this long-term increase in risks and shortening of expectations as
the possible explaining factor for the crisis of the political systems
and the pursuit of self-esteem through identity politics.
The horizon of expectations is linked to one’s sense of agency.
Antonovsky (1979) defines the sense of coherence, crucial to
coping, as a “feeling of confidence that one’s environment is
predictable and that things will work out as well as can reasonably
be expected.” It’s a mixture of optimism and control. People can
accept inequality, if they can hope to improve their lot by work
(Kelley and Evans, 2016). Hope means that one is able to project
oneself into the future (Cloninger, 2011). The sense control,
certainty and meaning have been acknowledged as crucial to
stabilizing the human psyche (Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Kay and
Eibach, 2013).
The loss of predictable careers, benefits, retirement plans,
and the diminishing expectations for one’s children have been
shattering people’s basic trust in the rules (Wilkinson and
Pickett, 2018). The L-HPA system, the stress reaction mechanism
of individuals, is not equally influenced by all stressors, but
primarily by uncontrollable stressors that have social-evaluative
aspects (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004).
The self-destructive behavior of workers studied by Anne Case
andAngusDeaton reflect hopelessness, but even well-to-do white
collars in Silicon Valley, for example, are preoccupied by fears of
losing their positions (Cooper, 2014; Case and Deaton, 2015a,b;
Pew Research Center, Social and Demographic Trends, 2015).
The present study evaluates the findings of political
psychology on the relationship between economic threats
and the turn away from class-based identifications.
I seek the explanation for the growing identity populism from
the following starting points.
i) Economic stress obviously activates latent authoritarian
tendencies and can render even liberals less tolerant.
ii) Economic disruptions can fuel nationalist populism, because
belonging to an identity group can restore one’s sense of
control and coherence by means of attachment.
iii) Disruptive winners (those oriented to social dominance,
SDO) and those who seek refuge from status threats (right-
wing authoritarians, RWA) could be imagined as antagonists
but obviously they complete each other.
The first one deals connects authoritarian reactions with the
historical situation summarized above. The second one takes into
account such ultimate dispositions as coalition formation and
self-balancing by means of group attachment, likewise triggered
by threat. The third one problematizes the mutual attraction
between disruptive economic liberals and risk-averse cultural
conservatives and why these can form identity-based tribes, using
the tools provided by the first two paragraphs to explain the
connection. Finally, I discuss why identity politics serves better




False consciousness has since the 1930s served as a stock
explanation for deviations from economic self-interests (Jost
and van der Toorn, 2012). Authoritarian personalities identify
themselves with the aggressor and blame the weak. However, this
explanation does take individual dispositions as causal factors
ignoring situational reactions. Furthermore, it does not consider
the improvement in child-rearing since the 1960s and the impact
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of the long-lasting economic security on younger generations
who can hardly be classified as authoritarians (Inglehart and
Norris, 2017).
The mass support suddenly elicited by a Donald Trump
cannot be explained by the dispositional authoritarianism
of voters, since the quasi-permanent disposition toward
authoritarian solutions can hardly change between two
presidential elections. Since individual differences in negativity
bias may remain stable over time (Norris et al., 2011), the rise of
right-wing movements during the 1930s and since 2007 might
be understood as situational authoritarian reactions triggered
by experiences of disorder and injustice. When disruptions are
interpreted as a culture war and not as a class struggle, right-wing
populism will result: authoritarian reactions attempt to restore
existential security and cognitive order.
The threats evoking RWA reactions are nowadays accepted as
being external, and are no longer viewed as internal tensions, as
was the case in early theories on the authoritarian personality. Yet
they are moderated by the dispositional frame of RWA: social
instability, criminality, deviance, and unemployment appear
primarily as disorder to potentially authoritarians (Duckitt, 2013;
Schaffer andDuckitt, 2013). According to Stenner (2005), latently
authoritarian people are likely to remain tolerant when they
do not feel themselves or their way of life to be threatened.
White hetero men in Western countries obviously experience
that the direction of history threatens their way of life right now.
Doty et al. (1991) differentiated dispositional from situational
authoritarians. Societal stress activates the authoritarian potential
among those who already are dormant authoritarians (Feldman
and Stenner, 1997; McCann, 2008; Duckitt, 2013). Unexpected,
ambiguous, disorderly stimuli generate more sympathetic system
responses in conservatives (Hibbing et al., 2014a). When people
have to compete for scarce resources, they become more
materialistic and violent, less trustful and less tolerant and
support more authoritarian leaders: they concentrate on seizing
immediate rewards at the cost of others and neglect thereby
not only the development of their cooperative capacities but
also any long-term care of themselves and their offspring.
Their horizon and strategy have shrunken. Stability based on
externalization as opposed to neuroticism seems to be linked
with system justification in authoritarian regimes and with right-
wing economic attitudes in democratic systems (Fatke, 2017, p.
887, 895).
Threats do not only activate dormant authoritarians but
they can also make non-authoritarians move toward intolerance
(Heatherington and Suhay, 2011). The needs for control and
safety do not basically differentiate liberals and conservatives.
Losses increase authoritarianism and decrease empathy in both
groups. Economic upheavals have been associated with increases
in F-scale scores (loyalty oaths, suppression of erotica, dominant
cartoon characters; Sales, 1973; Sales and Friend, 1973; Doty
et al., 1991). Experimental studies with manipulated threats and
longitudinal studies at national levels have shown higher RWA
in people who perceive themselves to be under threat (Doty
et al., 1991; Duckitt and Fischer, 2003; Jugert and Duckitt, 2009).
Perceived loss of control motivates those low in authoritarianism
to resort to authoritarian attitudes in order to regain a
sense of control (Mirisola et al., 2014). Social liberals, who
are distinguished from risk-averse conscientious conservatives
by their openness (Fatke, 2017, p. 884), can lose some of
their adventurousness when their basic security is threatened.
Mortality reminders and the criticism of one’s country by
foreigners can cause liberals to think like conservatives: the
great aggressively against the challengers of their worldviews
(McGregor et al., 1998; Nail et al., 2009; Jonas and Fritsche, 2013).
When threatened, both liberals and conservatives seek
confirmation of their opinions from the like-minded, select
information, and reject contradictory evidence (Skitka et al.,
2002; Castano et al., 2011; Proulx et al., 2012; Chambers et al.,
2013; Crawford et al., 2013; Brandt et al., 2014).
Reminded of their basic values under threat, liberals can
cling to liberal values (including intergroup fairness) even more
vehemently rather than moving to the right (Jonas and Fritsche,
2013). If the propensity to alleviate stress under threat by evoking
ingroup values crosses the party divide but does not alter the
values invoked, then the demand for group conformism may
be the factor that alters under threat. The impact of a tribal
mindset and identity-protective cognition on liberals has been
speculated about in regard to the heated emphasis on identity
politics: ethnic, gender, and cultural animosities seem to be
triggered more easily than class-based solidarity across identity
boundaries (Mann, 1993/2013; Lilla, 2016; Nagle, 2017, p 43–
44, 68–85; Pinker, 2018, p. 356–374). Convay et al. have tried
to disentangle authoritarianism and ideology by showing, how
leftist and liberal people let values override information, close
their minds and express both rigidity (prejudice, dogmatism,
and strong attitudes) and authoritarian punitiveness depending
on content domain (Convay et al., 2018; Dervin, 2018). If the
equation between rigid use of symbols and conservatism would
be dissolved, authoritarianism and conservatism could no longer
be used as synonyms in political psychology (see Jost et al., 2003).
Cultural closure attempts to maintain predictability in the
social world (Thorisdottir and Jost, 2011). Seen from the point of
view of personal coherence, people adhering to cultural closure
are overstretched by external forces and try to restore a sense
of control by symbolic means. When people’s sense of control is
threatened, they prefer social hierarchy (Friesen et al., 2014), as
if it offered a way of proxy control. Cross-country comparison
indicates how authoritarianism buffers threatened well-being
(Landau et al., 2015; Onraet et al., 2016).
Individual dispositions toward conservatism and liberalism
can be taken as mediating and moderating factors between
economic threat (cause) and political movements (reaction), not
as ultimate causes of political movements. Economic stress can
be mitigated by increasing symbolic control and confirming one’s
identity. This should imply that status politics is less in demand,
if everyday life becomes more predictable.
BELONGING TO GROUPS AS
COMPENSATORY CONTROL
Even the illusion of control can provide health benefits while a
loss of control can elicit aggression (Baumeister, 2005, p. 93–
103). Surveys have shown that people experience all that they
can personally influence as positive (family, hobbies, the content
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of their work), whereas bigger issues (politics, the economy,
the world) beyond their control appear as lost or corrupted
(Whitman, 1998). Extremism offers a sense of compensatory
control. When people feel uncertain, they may radicalize to
restore their sense of control (Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Kay
and Eibach, 2013. Cf. criticism by Safra et al., 2018). In the
U. S., most perpetrators of ideologically motivated crimes have
earlier experienced economic and social losses (Kruglanski
et al., 2014; Jasko et al., 2017). Ideologies justify individual
quests for self-esteem and significance: devotion to larger
issues restores self-worth, shaken by rejection, loss of control
and injustice.
Threats can be managed by affirming one’s core values and
belonging to a group (Proulx et al., 2012). The basic need to
belong and to receive recognition (Leary et al., 2006; Fisher et al.,
2010) favors coalition formation under stress. Attachment to
groups and ideas is pro-social behavior, the purpose of which is
to obtain confirmation and protection under duress. Attachment
as a system of self-soothing restores the shattered homeostasis
of individuals after arousal, anxiety, and anger caused by an
eventual mismatch with the environment. Cultural homogeneity,
including sacred rituals, are a way to ascertain a sense of being
attuned by others (Hart and Sussman, 2011; DiGorcia et al.,
2013; Simpson and Karantzas, 2019). Human brains become
synchronized by looking at the same object or listening to the
same melody (Freeman, 2000).
The need for coherence mediates between negativity bias
and political ideologies: when one can fight, one’s sense of
control is restored. Monitoring external threats, as conservatives
tend to do, may be just the sort of tractable task to
be completed in order to confirm one’s sense of agency.
Conservatives are neither fearful nor unhappy, since they are
able to deal with dangers externally instead of rationalizing
away their immediate emotions at the cost of their balance
and satisfaction; cognitive closure makes life less complicated
(Hibbing et al., 2014b, p. 337–341). Nationalist populism has
been able to turn individual anxieties into a collective fight vis-
à-vis clear-cut threats and thus confer a sense of self-efficacy
to its supporters instead of a sense of helpless victimization
(Bourke, 2005, p. 189–192). Trump promised to do something
spectacular immediately, instead of analyzing and ruminating
(Lilla, 2016). Marine Le Pen vowed that her first measure as
president would be to “re-establish real borders” for France.
The Brexiteers won by promising just the same (Krastev,
2017).
The desire to close national borders encompasses both the
real attempts to seize control of what happens to oneself and the
protective fantasies of fusion of the individual body with the body
of the national state. This fantasy of being a part of a greater
entity is not pathological as such but a precondition for basic
trust to assert one’s individual autonomy and to balance the need
to belong, on one hand, with individual differentiation, on the
other (Blatt and Levy, 2003). Identity groups are experienced as
if they were caregivers and described using family vocabulary
(“fatherland,” “mother Russia,” “children of France”). Nations can
be imagined but they have been able to confer meaning and
orientation (Anderson, 2006; Smith, 2010).
A threat against one’s self-esteem is expanded to encompass
national or western culture as an entity (Dervin, 2015; Nagle,
2017). “Making America great again” promised to ground-losing
white males that they could again become great as a part of
their large identity group. When collective social identities are
defended against perceived disrespect, collective pride suppresses
individual shame (Fisher et al., 2010; DeScioli, 2016; Jasko et al.,
2017). Large groups establish their identities in counterpoint
to those who oppose them and whom they oppose together.
Splitting apart and the projection of good and bad do not
allow for concern or remorse (Alford, 1989, p. 83–103; Volkan,
1988). This feature matches the conservative lack of neuroticism.
The need to remain immune to overwhelming stimulation can
override sophistication. In hostile competition, insensitive but
hyper-vigilant, risk-taking men succeed: they do not internalize
conflicts, empathize or experience shame (Nail et al., 2009; Del
Giudice et al., 2013).
During economic advances and increasing divisions of labor,
individuals have optimally adapted by means of social skills,
empathy, tolerance, and universal care. Individuating features,
differentiating interests and the need for self-actualization as a
person can prevail, as people feel safe and can free their mental
capacity from survival concerns. Chronically threatened people
lose cognitive capacities that are normally available to them
(Inglehart and Weltzel, 2005; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013;
Weltzel, 2013). High stress reactivity has been associated with
a decrease in the more recently evolved cognitive capacity to
regulate social and emotional responses (Flinn et al., 2013, p.
110). Creative individuals with a sensitive HPA axis can flourish
only when they do not experience threats (Del Giudice et al.,
2013).
Only when the survival is guaranteed, people can afford
investment in future and be open to new chances. Affluence
promotes time discounting, self-control, optimism, cognitive
exploration, and social trust (Baumard, 2018). Scarcity of
resources seems to bring to the fore conservative virtues that
support group cohesion (ingroup solidarity, authority, tradition,
purity) (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Graham et al., 2009; Sinn
and Hayes, 2017). The evolutionary disposition for coalition
formationmay benefit conservatives in so far as they become alert
to threats from outgroups and rather insensitive to threats posed
by impersonal, complex processes, like the climate crisis (Hibbing
et al., 2014a).
When threated, groups of people can behave like beehives and
try to forget their differentiating interests. To be consistent with
their identity, people can sacrifice their economic self-interest
and self-expression in favor of tradition, authority, and purity
of the group (Haidt, 2012; Kesebir, 2012). Such behavior is not
necessarily irrational, since both economic gains and belonging
to a group can be seen as motivated by a pursuit of control.
Evolutionary psychology points to a gender difference: while
women gain comfort from giving and receiving support in long-
term personal relationships, men are more prone to think in
terms of competing coalitions (Belsky, 2012).
Defensive reactions against unpredictable conditions and
offensive actions to gain advantages at the cost of others
become blurred in coalitional thinking. Social threats against
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the status quo, so important to right-wing authoritarians,
and threats against the privileged position of one’s nation,
crucial for the social-dominance-oriented, lead both groups
to react against the porosity of national borders. People
high in RWA believe that the world is dangerous, while
the metaphor for those high in SDO is that the world
is a competitive jungle. They focus on external dominance
over other coalitions (Duckitt and Sibley, 2010; Federico
et al., 2013). This shared sensibility concerning coalitional
threats favors cooperation between the disrupters of status
quo, the competitive egoists, and the disrupted, the risk-
averse conservatives.
However, in predicting hostility, RWAs and SDOs differ
from each other (Sinn and Hayes, 2018). Theories of the
all-encompassing negativity bias (Hibbing et al., 2014a), of a
group-binding morality (Graham et al., 2009) or of a general
resistance to social changes (Jost et al., 2003) do not catch this.
The coalitional mindset as such does not predispose people to
coalitional hostility. Positive attachment to one’s nation does
not necessarily lead to retaliatory hostility against outgroups
and a heightened sensitivity to offenses against collective
self-worth of one’s ingroup: research on Brexit has shown
that national identification/attachment (confident self-esteem
independent of others’ opinions) did not predict the referendum
vote, after the collective narcissism (defined as vulnerable self-
esteem dependent on comparison and external recognition) was
controlled for (De Zavala et al., 2017a,b). Outgroup hostility
is evoked first and foremost by status threat (Gidgron and
Hall, 2017). Collective narcissism seems to coincide rather with
insecure ingroup attachment which sensitizes people to any
perceived disrespect (De Zavala et al., 2017b). Obviously, RWAs
take to hostile comparisons when they are threatened with loss,
while SDOs in their competiveness might always think in terms
of zero-sum games (Duckitt, 2006).
Attachment to a group as mechanisms of relieving anxiety is
available to everyone but coalition formation with its large-group
dynamics favors the right-wing way to detect andmanage threats.
“Feeling good” in one’s national identification may refer to
the experienced protection offered by one’s national ingroup.
Feeling good as well as a sense of coherence are closely
related to a secure status (Gidgron and Hall, 2017). But
the possibility of “feeling not so good” before becoming
nationally attached, and the possible reasons for uneasiness,
have not been covered in the studies on national attachment
because attachment is taken as something permanent. National
narcissism, too, could be interpreted as a grandiose posture
against vulnerability taken after perceived humiliations, not
as a pre-existing, malignant and dominant personality trait
in the population (cf. Richards, 2018). German retaliatory
narcissism has been interpreted as a defense following loss of
self-worth after WWI: democratic elites were unable to handle
this narcissistic wound but Hitler offered identification with
strength (Kohut, 1978/1985, p. 81–94). If hostile narcissism
is understood as a way to cope with social comparisons,
it becomes historically contextualized instead of remaining a
static classification.
ARE SECURITY-SEEKERS AND
DISRUPTERS DESTINED TO BE ALLIES?
The increased interest in “situational authoritarianism” among
researchers reflects a search for a common human denominator
in the midst of the current culture wars. If various protesters
could see economic concerns from the same angle, they could
cease to imagine each other as “forbiddingly alien and other”
(Nussbaum, 1997, p. 85), and cooperate against moneyed
interests despite their principled antagonisms in cultural issues.
In that case, the populist rhetoric pitting common men against
“corrupt” elites (Mudde, 2015; Bos et al., 2018) would possibly
increase support for redistribution (Arikan and Cekecioglu,
2019). “Authoritarian neoliberalism,” conceived as redistribution
up by mobilizing aggressions down (Streeck, 2015; Bruff and
Tansel, 2018, 2019) would fade as the likeliest outcome of the next
long-lasting economic crisis.
The challenging question is whether cultural conservatives
and economic conservatives can ever oppose each other. Farmers
and small entrepreneurs surely have reacted against capitalist
land-grabbing, debt slavery and “unfair” pricing to recover what
has been rightfully theirs, but have also supported established
elites, depending on the threats to their way of life and alliances
with other strata (Moore, 1993, p. 92–110, 477–482, 298; Mann,
2012, p. 650–651, 695–718).
Adherence to traditional rules and discipline are the core of
cultural conservatism, while economic conservatism is defined
by the acceptance of hierarchy, inequality, and intergroup
dominance (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt and Sibley, 2009, 2010).
Since cultural conservatives and economic conservatives are
motivated by different concerns, their reactions to economic
losses should differ, too, despite their unifying ingroup
preference. Nevertheless, normative attitudes concerning groups
and families predict economic conservatism as well, and the
motive to reduce uncertainty makes even less-advantaged people
accept inequality (Thorisdottir et al., 2007, p. 179; Hibbing et al.,
2014a, p. 301, 305; Federico and Malka, 2018, p. 6).
From the point of view of political psychology, the
unconditional endorsement of private business among RWAs
can be explained either as an ontological view of life
as competition or as identifying with the system. Trump
voters criticized global competition but identified more with
American capitalism (Adevedo et al., 2017). They could imagine
themselves as entrepreneurs realizing American dream but felt
disadvantaged in the meritocratic competition of global elites
(Markovits, 2019). Submissive, order-loving persons try to accept
the fairness of the world that actually disfavors them. If they can
only can see natural or divine order behind actual injustices, hope
is sustained. Identification with the established order can and
often does override even realistic pessimism about one’s chances
in that order: false consciousness is not even needed, the search
for emotional security by compliance is enough (Thorisdottir
et al., 2009; Landau et al., 2015; van der Toorn et al., 2015; Jost,
2017; Jost et al., 2017).
For liberal researchers themselves, one way to save their
optimist conception of the innate nature of people has been the
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redefinition of conservative ingroup morality as altruism. Haidt
has tried to make conservatives more familiar in the eyes of
liberals by emphasizing their moral commitment to other people
in contrast to egoists, be they self-expressive liberals or profit-
seeking businessmen. Sinn and Hayes (2017), on the other hand,
deny the allegedly broader scope of conservative morality in
comparison with alleged liberal “self-actualizers,” emphasizing
instead the all-encompassing care evident in liberals and the
shared ingroup preference of SDOs and RWAs.
Those whose motivation to care and to be fair is universal,
are sensitive to exploitation within groups. Individualizing or
universalizing motivation loads negatively against a social-
dominance orientation. Liberals can sacrifice individual
autonomy for the common good defined universally as
environmental conservation, while the authoritarian emphasis
on the common good, the social coherence of the ingroup,
is connected with outgroup antagonism (including deviating
groups within) (Sinn and Hayes, 2017, 2018). Universal morals
transcending ingroups and self-expression became conceivable
only after the violence of pre-statist societies was eliminated,
the need for close-knit ingroups as protectors lessened and
affluence allowed individuals personal choices (Berggren and
Trägårdh, 2006/2015; Newson and Richerson, 2009; Hruschka
and Henrich, 2013; Siedentop, 2014; Sinn and Hayes, 2017).
The inner tension among conservatives between egoist
disrupters and altruistic community builders is turned into
energizing coalitional synergy: when people defend themselves
by supporting ingroup hierarchies, they become less sensitive
to exploitation by leading group-members. The evolutionary
default setting, the ingroup preference uniting SDOs and RWAs,
makes system justification also a rational choice for RWA.
By supporting exploitative leaders, cooperating moralists can
enjoy the fruits of group-based dominance (Sinn and Hayes,
2018, p. 1124–1126). SDOs can be imagined as alpha males,
eager to achieve dominant positions in hierarchical ingroups
(Liddle et al., 2012). Dominant alphas are motivated by the
lion’s share of the booty they get when some outgroup is
beaten (Gavrilets and Fortunato, 2014). Altruistic moralists
use exploitative bullies (Volk et al., 2012; Garandeau et al.,
2014; Goodboy et al., 2016) as their proxies to carry out
morally suspect but necessary decisions. Those who submit
themselves to the dominant leaders are attracted by their winner-
like habitus.
Males in general are ready to cooperate within their group
when facing coalitional competition. A hierarchical coalition
can prevent free-riding, which improves its competitiveness
compared with egalitarian groups (Sinn and Hayes, 2017, 2018,
p. 1124; Friesen et al., 2014). According to Sinn and Hayes,
authoritarian morale evolved as an adaptation that reduced
competition within ingroups struggling for resources against
other coalitions. It operates through kin-detection in dividing
large non-kin groups, such as religion or ethnicity, as in us
vs. them (Heylen and Pauwels, 2015; Sinn and Hayes, 2017,
2018). Populist right-wingers recommend severe punishment
for those who infringe on authority (Mudde, 2015, p. 296).
Identification with the dominance exhibited by “strong” leaders
may compensate for individual insecurity in the labor market.
Strongmen such as Berlusconi, Erdogan, Putin, Bolsonaro, or
Trump are justified by the mere facticity of their success.
Due to the shared acceptance of hierarchical order, in addition
to the shared ingroup preference, the striking difference in risk
tolerance does not drive apart those high in RWA and those
high in SDO. The SDOs are insensitive to any kind of risk as
well as concern for these the risk-takers themselves or other
people. RWAs, on the other hand, are not only wary of cultural
changes but are still capable of imagining the economic fall-out of
risky business behavior on themselves, as well. Loss aversion and
authoritarianism go together but the causal mechanisms between
them are far from clear. Paradoxically, the reckless risk-takers are
driving risk-averse conformers toward the right: the latter adapt
to disruptions by identifying themselves with social order and
their supposed superiority as conformers (Asbrock et al., 2017;
Johnston and Madson, 2017; Federico and Malka, 2018, p. 6–7;
Dörre, 2018).
The common superiority motive gluing together SDOs and
RWAs must be able to succumb to the centrifugal forces of
family values. The short-term life strategy of SDOs explains
why they do not care about sexual restrictions. For RWAs,
the “binding” motive suggests prosocial sacrifices of individual
interests and sexual freedoms for the group cohesion, while SDOs
consequently choose egoist strategy. SDOs only feign cooperation
but seek power within the groups at the cost of others (Pratto
and Hegarty, 2000; Cross and Fletcher, 2011; Kenrick et al.,
2013; McCullough et al., 2013; Petersen et al., 2013; Price et al.,
2017; Sinn and Hayes, 2017, 2018). RWAs prefer affectionate
socialization in stable families and communities (Duckitt, 2001;
Peterson and Zurbriggen, 2010; Sinn and Hayes, 2018). SDOs
try to maximize their gains in harsh, low-trust and unpredictable
environments, while RWAs attempt to establish niches of reliable
reciprocation within the competitive world by means of marital
fidelity and religious sanctions against disruptive egoism (Boehm
and Flack, 2010; Sinn and Hayes, 2018, p. 1134). Those who
score high in SDO, score high only in those RWA themes linked
with authoritarian aggression while being indifferent in regard to
authoritarian submission and conventionalism.
As to the basic conflict between individual rights and
social cohesion, SDOs with their materialist values approach
cultural liberals, who prefer individual autonomy and self-
regulation to traditions. According to Sinn and Hayes, persons
high in SDO differ from liberals in the dimension between
self-transgression and self-enhancement. They are more self-
promoting than altruistic RWAs, who submit themselves
to established authorities and reject both self-direction and
universalism. Those high in RWA react with authoritarian
aggression to normative deviance as a threat to social order,
since their peace of mind depends on defensive prejudices and
guaranteed social cohesion (Feldman, 2003, p. 46, 67; Feldman
and Stenner, 1997; Duckitt, 2006; Passini, 2017, p. 74–76, 80–84;
Sinn and Hayes, 2017).
Dissonances are imaginable between reckless winners and
conformists, if dominance motivation for the sake of survival
does not prevail. For many submissive authoritarians, Trump,
the reckless business tycoon and womanizer, did not behave
himself respectably enough. He was more able to appeal
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to aggressive authoritarians, who are close to being social-
dominance-orientated and have low agreeableness (Ludeke et al.,
2017). The factor that allows most cultural conservatives to
ignore Trump’s deviations from the religious code of conduct
was—according to explicit statements by evangelical leaders—his
imagined role as a warrior king overcoming their externalized
enemies in the culture wars (Adams, 2018).
Economic questions borrow their affective power from value-
laden issues (Johnston et al., 2017). Mass support for capitalism is
mediated through the imagined moral order: rewards and losses
are seen as deserved or not (Jost, 2017). Conscientiousness has
been linked with capitalism and self-responsibility instead of
collective social security provided by the state, but this established
connection between conscientiousness and conservatism might
presuppose fair rewards for self-responsibility (Fatke, 2017).
Unfair rewards and punishment could drive hard-working
people from the winners of financial speculation, who obviously
do not reciprocate in their games (Sinn and Hayes, 2018, p.
231–232, 234). A striking imbalance of gains should also weaken
such system justification that is based on the expected coalitional
advantages of submission to dominant persons, and strengthen
the impact of the phylogenetic disposition of fairness (Van Vugt
et al., 2008; Jost, 2017; Starmans et al., 2017). Conscientious
people who have fulfilled their duties, react to the eventual loss
of income more than careless spenders. Unemployment prevents
the conscientious from building up property as a safety valve
and shatters the meaning of life. It can cause depression, since
the conscientious blame themselves for the losses instead of the
conditions of life. If the meaningful relationship between their
efforts and the rewards has been broken, men in particular let go;
they become irritable and can give up job-seeking (Boyce et al.,
2010, 2013, 2015, 2016). In the U.S., white-collars are employed
more on the basis of the personal impression they make. If they
are rejected, they feel flawed as persons (Sharone, 2014).
Stress experienced by the conscientious is always explained by
a real or possible loss of their economic position, their status,
their relationships, their beliefs, or their self-esteem (Hobfoll,
1989). The search for confirmation of shattered selves (De Botton,
2005, p. 3–7) may also explain, why conscientious people can
react with status enhancement (Gidgron and Hall, 2017). To
recruit cultural conservatives to support disruptive economics,
political entrepreneurs bundle together contradictory themes by
framing economic issues with moral ideals (“freedom,” “family,”
“responsibility,” “patriotism”). Emotional frames are charged
with anger and disgust that render compromises impossible
(Clifford, 2019). According to Federico and Malka (2018), the
link between certainty and security needs, on one hand, and
conservative political preferences, on the other, is moderated
by ideological packages and people’s need to follow their party
in every respect (identity-expressive motive). In the U.S., even
politically passive high authoritarians can satisfy their longing
for security and order by supporting redistributive and regulative
economic policy. As the catch-all group identification fades,
economic interests can have their influence. Even politically
active authoritarians can oppose free trade and favor government
interventions, if the question is not embedded in the conservative
Weltanschauung. Politically active citizens, however, defend the
party ticket in its entirety (Federico and Malka, 2018, p. 23–28,
31; Johnston, 2017, 2018).
In post-communist societies and among politically less
conscious voters in western countries, the preference for
economic protection can align with right-wing cultural attitudes,
especially among the lower social classes (Lefkofridi et al., 2014;
Malka et al., 2017b; Federico and Malka, 2018, p. 33). In such
cases, leftist economic policy has represented stability, whereas in
western societies, the threat to stability used to come from the left
ever since the French revolution. In Eastern Europe, openness to
gaymarriages has been associated with privatization and austerity
programs, while family values have been harnessed by socialist
parties (Federico and Malka, 2018, p. 20–21).
According to the meta-analysis by Federico and Malka, the
majority of studies show how strong needs for existential security
and epistemological certainty (measured as authoritarianism,
threat sensitivity, and cognitive closure) go together with cultural
conservatism but do not correlate with conservative economic
views (e.g., Jost, 2006; Duckitt and Sibley, 2009; Feldman and
Johnston, 2014; Malka and Soto, 2015; Johnston et al., 2017;
Federico and Malka, 2018, p. 9–18, 27). Logically, the prospect of
social backsliding should benefit left-leaning populism (Brown-
Ianuzzi et al., 2015).
When leftist politicians can attune themselves to fear of
loss and consequent status anxiety (Gidgron and Hall, 2017),
they could attract floating voters. The most authoritarian right-
wing populists have usually never supported Bernie Sanders in
American politics, but Sanders was able to appeal to moderately
authoritarian (center-right, “average” authoritarians) and not
only to the culturally liberal leftist core. Sanders tried to
overcome identity politics and instead emphasize class-based,
unifying themes. Among voters in Western Europe, cultural
conservatism is often linked with support for redistributive
policies (Lefkofridi et al., 2014). Considerable number of center-
left populists has been found among the voters for Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD) (Rothmund et al., 2017). The average
voters for the Swedish Democrats in 2018 had suffered economic
losses since 2006 and felt the insecurity of working life (Jilani,
2018). Among those who voted for UKIP in Britain to support
Brexit, a large group opposed both overwhelming cultural
changes and economic insecurity (Harper and Hogue, 2017).
During the economic recession since 2008, right-wing populist
parties adopted protectionist and interventionist themes able to
attract authoritarians on the left from social democrat parties
(Mudde, 2013; Lefkofridi and Michel, 2016). Marine Le Pen
has been courting the “yellow vest” protesters, evidently airing
economic frustration and concerns about the growing inequality
under globalization.
Evidence of party interchangeability indicates how cultural
conservatives can be moved by economic insecurity as well as
by coalitional threats, and how people from the left can at least
occasionally seek security by means of cultural closure. Using
survey data from 99 nations, Malka, Lelkes, and Soto found
not only that right-left attitude organization is uncommon, but
that it is more common for culturally and economically right-
wing attitudes to correlate negatively with each other, an attitude
structure reflecting a contrast between desires for cultural and
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economic protection vs. freedom. The class of freedom-seekers
consists of those who are both economically neoliberal and
culturally progressive, whereas the group of protection-seekers
consists of those who favor wealth redistribution and cultural
conservatism (Malka et al., 2017a,b).
Despite the evidence of widespread risk-aversion, the
combination of conservative cultural attitudes and a leftist
economic policy remains underrepresented in party politics
in Europe (Lefkofridi et al., 2014, p. 66). Paradoxically,
individualization works here for total identification with all-
good parties fighting against their all-bad adversaries. The post-
materialist values of autonomy and self-actualization emerged
from a sufficient level of material welfare (Inglehart and
Weltzel, 2005), but expectations for individual identity work have
persisted after the fragmentation of universal welfare (Koppetsch,
2010). Strong ties with one’s overarching group of reference
are needed to counterbalance individualized economic risks and
the challenges of identity work. Outrage aroused by symbolic
insults against one’s collective identity can support the personal
coherence of lonely individuals: it confers orientation (Brady
et al., 2017; Sasse, 2018). This metapolitical search for the
mirroring of one’s self (Heatherington andWeiler, 2009) provides
an affective impetus for party ideologies. The number of floating
voters, who consider issues one by one without any consistent
ideology, has decreased (Johnston et al., 2017, p. 6; Federico
and Malka, 2018, p. 21; Caprara and Vecchione, 2018, p. 62–
65, 75–77). Income levels do no longer differentiate voters’
values: Republicans and Democrats are bound together by values
concerning social issues, not by class. Themost heated ideological
cleavage divides rich Democrats or rich Republicans. Class issues
and class voting have declined in Western democracies since the
1980s (Ciuk et al., 2018, p. 881–883; Inglehart and Norris, 2017).
Alienation from party politics, evident in Europe during the
1990s, worries established, interest-based parties but not populist
parties fueled by identity motivation. The U.S. Republican Party
has benefited from the overlap of social identities (white, male,
protestant) with party affiliationmore than the Democratic Party,
which consists of overtly diverse subgroups. The GOP functions
more than Democrats as a tribe that monitors its symbolic purity
(Federico and Malka, 2018; Mason and Wronski, 2018, p. 29).
Experiential openness is linked with easy everyday orientation
and the management of life. If the environment is not
predictable, and biographical self-experience not continuous,
the mind’s closing down can be expected depending on both
individual dispositions and the perceived threats to one’s
position. Ontological security presupposes not only a continuous
and consistent view of the world but fair social institutions,
as well (Giddens, 1991; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 2017, p. 37,
91–92; Harper and Hogue, 2017). Uncompromising values in
politics establish epistemological security. RWAs are capable of
recognizing economic injustice but their need for security is
moderated by their conception of just order.
National populists have succeeded by embedding economic
security themes in the ascribed group identity. Front National
voters in France have been worried about the future of their
way of life, not only their standard of living (Reynié, 2013, p.
37–47, 100–132). In Germany, AfD is now more popular than
the traditional Social Democratic Party among unskilled and
unionized workers. It has been able to turn class struggle into
an interethnic competition over welfare redistribution and has
labeled traditional trade union leaders as internationalist class
traitors. Identity politics guarantees respectability by classifying
even low-paid natives, by definition, among hard-working and
middle-class Germans, while defining immigrants as lazy (Dörre,
2018). In its economic policy, the AfD endorses neoliberalism
within national states but favors protective borders. In their
comparative analysis of euro-skeptic parties, Slobodian and
Plehwe (2018) warn against any premature contrasting of
protectionist populists against neoliberal globalists.
Identity politics unite the right wing, whereas it divides the
groups on the left along ethnic, cultural, and gender lines.
Leftist parties lose the votes of white males by focusing only on
women and immigrants while classifying all white males among
the privileged. In the alt-right net forums, the left and liberals
are routinely included among overbearing global elites. These
forums are responding to leftist identity politics with the identity
politics of white males (Hawley, 2017; Haider, 2018). Class-based
solidarity may be possible, if leftist parties can offer ontological
security bymeans of a convincing economic program and include
even white males into its conception of historical progress.
DISCUSSION AND CAVEATS
Declining economic security and cultural changes amount to
status threat: threatened people no longer feel themselves as fully
recognized, competent members of their society (Gidgron and
Hall, 2017; Fukuyama, 2018). Individual dispositions still matter
for political choices, but experiences of economic insecurity drive
more voters than 30 years ago toward survival values and away
from postmaterialist liberalism (Inglehart and Norris, 2017).
The subjective sense of security can be improved by
attachment to group and ideologies. Attachment to groups as
prosocial behavior is triggered by perceived threats. Belonging
to a group confirms one’s individual sense of coherence. Because
large groups create their identity in opposition to other groups,
a coalitional mindset (especially prevalent among men) is
thereby activated. This mindset moves in the same direction
as the conservative negativity bias, the sensitivity to external
threats by other groups (instead of abstract threats such as
economic injustice and environment degradation). Longing for
order and orientation may favor right-wing mobilization, while
liberal features such as openness, tolerance for ambiguity, and
universalism prevent the formation of coherent coalitions. In
particular, alt-right trolls externalize and blame their targets
without strict moral self-scrutiny, while overtly self-reflective
liberals become easily hindered when criticized for being too
privileged to speak for vulnerable groups. While empathy
and sensitivity have been the best adaptations to complex
interdependencies in progressing societies, a lack of both
empathy and a sense of guilt may offer a competitive edge for
individuals and groups struggling for scarce resources.
The left and liberals are in no way immune to tribal
coalition formation, and they create group cohesion through
mutual value affirmation as well. However, for now the tribal
way of managing threats serves more the right-wing parties,
since it depoliticizes class-based themes or transforms them
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into ethnic rivalry. Left-wing populism, the Occupy movement
for instance, had been fragmented from the beginning by an
overemphasis of ascribed group differences being an obstacle to
mutual cooperation. Fragmented identity groups are not willing
to sacrifice their demands for personal recognition in order to
find the lowest common denominator for a class-based coalition
of divergent individuals.
Groups are bound by ideologies and values. Cultural
conservatism and RWA support group cohesion, and SDO is
dovetailed with RWA through outgroup hostility: dominant,
egoist leaders are chosen as effective representatives of ingroups
for zero-sum resource games. Counter-intuitively, disruptive
winners (SDOs) and those who seek protection from status
threats (RWAs), are seldom driven apart despite their different
economic interests, since enlarged kin detection and system
justification glue them together. Exploitation within the ingroup
and deviations from the moral code of conduct by leaders do not
challenge their legitimacy.
Seeking social confirmation of one’s worth within an ingroup
can be seen as a universal mechanism for coping with anxiety
and not limited to conservatives. The coalitional mindset and
evolutionary preparedness against external dangers are ultimate
causal factors and do not override class politics on their own.
Exploring the causal path between economic crisis and populisms
may exceed the boundaries of experimental social psychology and
presuppose counterfactual imagination.
Kinship or the tribal system of security is activated only
when bureaucratic, politically negotiated security networks of
developed countries fail or are expected to fail. Coalitional
identity politics supplant class-based parties only when these
have become unable to relieve the anxieties of voters. The rise
of right-wing populism occurred as late as during the financial
crisis since 2008, not during theWashington consensus following
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the freeing global trade.
First, voters under pressure tried the social democrats but were
disappointed, since leftist government could offer no alternative
to running just to stay in place. Individuals, companies
and countries were caught up in the global acceleration of
competition, while at the same time wages and social security
were being cut (Mann, 1993/2013; Dörre, 2018; Wagner, 2018).
Mass immigration was only the last indication of the loss of
sovereignty of national states.
Due to welfare retrenchment, economic risks are
individualized. Polarization of the labor market also renders
people sensitive to status ranking. The increased emphasis on
collective identities counterbalance the possibility of losing
everything as individual. Zero-sum games for respect between
identity groups have been exacerbated during the long recession.
Identity politics operates with the deeply ingrained patterns of
the coalitional mind rewarding participating individuals with
immediate self-satisfaction for being a part of righteous group.
Class coalitions, instead, equate to long-term strategic reasoning.
The shortening of the horizon of expectations and the causes of
the increased short-term reasoning in the West deserves further
studies. During the last few centuries, class consciousness has
been often encumbered by ethnic, religious, occupational and
sectional divisions (Mann, 2012). While universalism was the
main strategy for the working classes and minorities to gain
equality in industrialized societies for most of the twentieth
century, national and religious particularisms have since then
channeled the protest of the excluded.
When economic losses and status threats are compensated
for by boosting collective identity, political reaction turns
away from global capitalism toward the cultural content of
globalization. Cultural liberals have been held accountable for
the general weakening of the ontological security that economic
liberals have promoted through global race-to-the-bottom wage
competition and financial bubbles. Culture-liberal leftist parties
demanding status sacrifices from western middle-class have
been successfully identified as globalist intruders threatening the
achieved advantages of working people. In opposition to them,
new right-wing parties willingly support the advantages of the
western middle-classes, if these advantages are defined vis à vis
outgroups and do not threaten the relative competitiveness of
national companies. If left-wing parties try to win back the votes
of less educated white males, they should include them into their
narrative of historical progress. Being able to project oneself into
a positive future can confirm one’s need for coherence and may
alleviate frustrations (cf. Cloninger, 2011).
The findings of political psychology indicate not only the shift
of liberals toward the right when under threat and the activation
of situational, centrist authoritarianism, but also the fact that
passive conservatives or centrist authoritarians may acknowledge
economic injustices and occasionally support leftist policies.
Unfair losses may make conscientious conservatives angry, but
their anger can be deflected by means of system justification
or simply by the suspicion that a possible redistribution of
wealth would favor groups other than theirs. In particular, ethnic
minorities are easily suspected of being free riders (Alesina et al.,
2001; Larsen, 2008; Jensen and Svendsen, 2009; Peterson, 2015;
Federico and Malka, 2018, p. 35–36). A permanent underclass in
absolute need does not elicit as much redistributive compassion
as a sudden fall of middle-class income (Delton et al., 2018, p. 911,
919). To gain majoritarian support, redistributive politics would
presuppose universal benefits for the middle classes (Arikan
and Cekecioglu, 2019, p. 1114), too, and trust in the reciprocal
shouldering of its cost between people in different phases of
life. Increasing inequality and growing social distances diminish
social trust necessary for redistribution (Gärtner and Prado,
2016).
Issues such as the best way of increase welfare, the role of
redistribution and immigration remain divisive in any event,
and value choices are not ultimately reducible to psychological
dispositions. In order to establish the impact of psychological
factors on the attitudes concerning economy or immigration,
opinion differences should be measured within psychological
classes as well, not only between them.
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